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Healthcare professionals including psychotherapists are legally and ethically obliged to 
ensure informed consent for the provided treatments comprising type and duration or 
potential benefits and possible risks (e.g., side effects) among others. In the present 
contribution, we argue that as potential benefit, informed consent can foster the patient’s 
meaning response. Moerman’s notion of the meaning response as the physiological or 
psychological effects of meaning in the course and treatment of an illness is a useful 
concept in explaining the effects of communicating a treatment rationale as part of the 
informed consent procedure. The more compelling the rational explanation of the targeted 
treatment effects including an explanatory model and a model of unique and common 
change mechanisms, the stronger the meaning response is expected to be resulting in 
increased hope and positive expectations with regard to the treatment.
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INTRODUCTION: THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF INFORMED 
CONSENT IN PSYCHOTHERAPY
Informed consent provides the major legal and moral legitimation for physical medicine as well 
as psychological interventions including psychotherapy independent of the setting, be  it inpatient 
or outpatient, individual, couples, or group therapy (American Psychiatric Association, 1998; 
Beauchamp and Childress, 2013; Trachsel et  al., 2015a,b). For that reason, informed consent 
is a necessary prerequisite for any intervention and a moral duty, reflecting the individual’s 
right to self-determination (moral principles: respect for autonomy; dignity), patient well-being, 
and protection (moral principle: beneficence), as well as doing no harm (moral principle: 
non-maleficence). By meeting all those moral values, informed consent has been named a 
central element of patient-centered care in a contribution in the JAMA (Krumholz, 2010). Patient-
centered care has been named as one of six core attributes of a high-quality health care system 
by the Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care in America is defined as 
“providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, 
and values, and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions” (IOM, 2001, p.  40).
Accordingly, informed consent is a central tenet of the American Medical Association (2006), 
which holds that “the physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make choices 
from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice” (Opinion 8.08) 
and that “withholding medical information from patients without their knowledge or consent 
is ethically unacceptable” (Opinion 8.082).
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According to Beauchamp and Childress (2013), informed 
consent must include the following components: patient decision-
making capacity (DMC) and voluntariness; disclosure of relevant 
information by the healthcare professional; and the statement 
of consent itself. With regard to DMC, the following criteria 
are widely accepted (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998): (1) ability 
to understand the relevant information; (2) ability to appreciate 
the disorder and the consequences of the situation; (3) ability 
to reason about treatment choices; and (4) ability to communicate 
a choice. These criteria have been criticized for their exclusive 
focus on cognition while neglecting emotional processes (for 
a summary of this debate, see Hermann et al., 2016). As DMC 
often changes with symptom fluctuation over time and across 
different situations (Trachsel et  al., 2015a,b), its validity can 
generally be  assumed only for the time of assessment.
For decades, it has been argued that informed consent should 
become a standard element of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic 
practice, as in other fields of medicine (Beahrs and Gutheil, 
2001). The American Psychiatric Association (1998), p.  24, 
declared that a “psychiatrist shall not withhold information that 
the patient needs or reasonably could use to make informed 
treatment decisions […].” Similarly, the Meta Code of Ethics 
of the European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations (2005) 
requires “clarification and continued discussion of the professional 
actions, procedures and probable consequences of the psychologist’s 
actions to ensure that a client provides informed consent before 
and during psychological intervention” (Art. 3.1.3).
Informed consent should include among others type, duration, 
and costs of a treatment, or potential benefits and possible 
risks such as side effects. As it is one of the most important 
insights in medicine since the time of Hippokrates that medical 
treatments can harm, side effects are well known and studied 
for many treatments, and should therefore be  communicated 
to patients as part of the informed consent process. In 
psychotherapy, however, side effects have been less studied 
although it has been always obvious that mere speaking can 
have negative effects (e.g., Linden and Schermuly-Haupt, 2014). 
Despite this fact, there is no consensus what psychotherapy 
side effects are and how to assess them (see Linden et  al., 
2018). Furthermore, side effects are often entangled with 
symptoms of the disorder itself or unsuccessful therapy (Hoffmann 
et al., 2008). However, these are no good reasons to get around 
informing patients that side effects also occur in psychotherapy, 
even if the therapist does her or his best and acts according 
to evidence-based principles of good psychotherapy.
Furthermore, it should also be disclosed if there exist multiple 
relationships, which have the potential to lead into conflicts 
of interest. Multiple relationships occur when a therapist is in 
a professional role with a client while simultaneously being 
in another role with the same person, a person closely associated 
with or related to the client, or promises to enter into a 
secondary relationship with any of those mentioned persons 
in the future (American Psychological Association, 2016). For 
example, in countries in which outpatient psychotherapy is 
not covered by statutory health insurances, this can lead to 
financial interests of the therapist with regard to the psychotherapy 
fee, which should be disclosed in the process of informed consent.
At its best, the most important contents of the informed 
consent should be  put to record and the patient should 
be  provided with it in written form. However, this is not 
mandatory in most jurisdictions and oral informed consent 
is legally sufficient.
Regrettably, informed consent for psychotherapy remains 
non-routine (Trachsel et  al., 2015a,b); instead, Dsubanko-
Obermayr and Baumann (2010) suggested that agreement in 
relation to treatment and its elements is most often tacitly 
assumed but rarely explicated.
Beyond legal and moral duty, informed consent can benefit 
the psychotherapeutic process and outcome, especially through 
the healthcare professional’s disclosure of relevant information. 
In line with the apparent consensus that certain common factors 
are relevant to outcome (see e.g. Wampold and Imel, 2015), 
and based on the principle that informed consent requires 
adequate disclosure of treatment information, it can be  argued 
that the relevance of common factors for psychotherapy’s effects 
should also be  conveyed to patients (see also Gaab et  al., 
2016). If patient autonomy is to be respected, therapists should 
provide their patients with the following information. (1) 
Agreement about the goals and tasks of therapy may support 
treatment success. (2) A good working alliance between patient 
and therapist can foster good psychotherapy processes and 
outcomes, and patients should feel supported, encouraged, and 
understood by their therapist. (3) Patients should be  aware 
that their view of the therapist and the proposed treatment 
may also help or hinder therapy (Blease et  al., 2016a,b). For 
example, agreement about goals and tasks is important in 
augmenting mutual trust and is central to the therapeutic 
alliance as a key component of a successful outcome 
(Lambert and Barley, 2002; Horvath et  al., 2011).
As part of the disclosure of relevant information in the 
context of informed consent, psychotherapists are also required 
to provide a plausible treatment rationale. This may include 
both an explanatory model (why a certain person is having 
a certain problem) and a model of treatment (what should 
be  done to solve this person’s problem)—that is, assumed and 
empirically supported unique and common mechanisms of 
change. With some patients, however, it might take considerable 
time and more than one or two sessions to develop an appropriate 
explanatory model as part of an informed consent. Comorbidity 
with several mental disorders (including personality disorders) 
in concert with multiple somatic disorders may further complicate 
and prolong the assessment period before a meaningful case 
formulation may be  possible. In these cases, the development 
of an explanatory model and preparation of an individual case 
formulation may become a treatment goal in its own right 
and should be  discussed as a part of the informed consent 
process (see also Tryon, 2019).
In the present contribution, we argue that as potential benefit, 
informed consent can foster the patient’s meaning response. 
Moerman’s notion of the meaning response as the physiological 
or psychological effects of meaning in the course and treatment 
of an illness is a useful concept in explaining the effects of 
communicating a treatment rationale as part of the informed 
consent procedure. The more compelling the rational explanation 
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of the targeted treatment effects including an explanatory model 
and a model of unique and common change mechanisms, the 
stronger the meaning response is expected to be  resulting in 
increased hope and positive expectations with regard to 
the treatment.
In the following sections, we will present Moerman’s notion 
of the meaning response, its relation to the treatment rationale, 
its contribution as a way to realize common factors in 
psychotherapy, as well as its relation to therapy outcome. Earlier, 
we  present our conclusion in the last section of the present 
article, we  provide a fictional case example illustrating how 
the meaning response may contribute to the realization of 
common psychotherapy factors.
THE MEANING RESPONSE
Provision of a plausible treatment rationale, including assumed 
and empirically supported unique and common mechanisms 
of change, meets the legal and moral demands of informed 
consent. On the other hand, a plausible treatment rationale 
is all the more important because “[c]linical experience and 
an accumulating body of research suggests that clients who 
enthusiastically buy into a cognitive-behavioral treatment 
rationale show more favorable outcomes” (Addis and Carpenter, 
2000, p.  147). It seems likely that this effect also plays a role 
in other forms of psychotherapy.
But how might a convincing treatment rationale foster good 
psychotherapy outcomes? It is sometimes assumed that providing 
a rational explanation of treatment effects makes a favorable 
outcome more likely by the patient’s meaning response. Moerman 
and Jonas defined meaning response as “the physiologic or 
psychological effects of meaning in the origins or treatment 
of illness” (Moerman and Jonas, 2002, p.  472), elaborating 
this as “the idea of ‘meaning’ to which people, when they are 
sick, often respond” (Moerman and Jonas, 2002, p.  471). 
Moerman contended that “the most important aspect of any 
medical experience is its content […] [b]ut the content of 
medicines is not the only thing that counts” (Moerman and 
Jonas, 2002, p.  47) and that “The form of medical treatment, 
not just its content, can have a dramatic effect on human 
wellbeing” (Moerman and Jonas, 2002, p.  66).
Meaning making is central to every treatment, including 
psychotherapy. Moerman (2002), p.  94, stated that “[t]o me, 
it sounds […] reasonable to say that psychotherapy evokes 
meaning responses”. This is a thought that Frank (1993) already 
had in mind when he  wrote his seminal book Persuasion and 
Healing in 1961, in which he “proposed the then-radical notion 
that all forms of psychotherapy, as different as they were on 
the surface, worked because they contained similar elements” 
(Moerman, 2002, p.  93)—for example, a helping relationship 
involving the therapist’s thoughtful listening. According to 
Moerman, Frank said in one interview that “[p]sychotherapy 
relies on the fact that human beings react not to the facts or 
events themselves but to the meanings of the facts as they 
interpret them. Psychotherapy is the transformation of the 
meanings that patients attribute to events from negative to 
positive” (Moerman, 2002, p. 96). In similar vein, Irving Kirsch 
observed: “The point is that meaning is the essence of 
psychotherapy. It is through meaning that treatment effects are 
supposed to be  brought about” (Kirsch, 2010, p.  164). Kirsch 
referenced Albert Ellis’s rational emotive therapy—the first 
cognitive therapy for emotional problems—which fundamentally 
presupposed “that the way we  feel does not depend on the 
events that happen to us, but rather on the meaning these 
events have for us” (Kirsch, 2010, p.  164). Kirsch went on: 
“[w]hat we  need is a way to activate a therapeutic meaning 
response in clinical practice, and to do so without deceiving 
people or playing tricks on them […]” (Kirsch, 2010, p.  165).
Meaning making seems central to verbalizing negative 
experiences, whether in oral or written form. In many studies, 
James W. Pennebaker found that writing or talking about 
traumatic events consistently helped patients to experience positive 
health effects of some sort (see for example, Pennebaker, 1997). 
Moerman (2002) drew on later studies by Pennebaker that 
showed why some “trauma writers” experienced better outcomes: 
“[…] they write better stories—stories that are more coherent, 
more persuasive, better organized. In a word, their stories seem 
(to me) to be  more meaningful” (Moerman, 2002, p.  98).
Moerman and Jonas (2002) provided several examples from 
pharmacology to illustrate the notion of meaning response. 
For example, referring to Branthwaite and Cooper (1981), they 
stated: “Branded aspirin worked better than unbranded aspirin, 
which worked better than branded placebo, which worked 
better than unbranded placebo. […] Aspirin relieves headaches, 
but so does the knowledge that the pills you  are taking are 
‘good’ ones” (Moerman and Jonas, 2002, p.  471). In their 
view, it seems reasonable to characterize these effects (other 
than those of the branded aspirin) as meaning responses, as 
the study participants seemed to assign meaning to the 
intervention. In addition, Moerman and Jonas noted the 
common and widely replicated “meanings” that most people 
share: “(1) Red means ‘up,’ ‘hot,’ ‘danger,’ while blue means 
‘down,’ ‘cool,’ ‘quiet’ and (2) two means more than one” 
(Moerman and Jonas, 2002, p.  472).
In sum, Moerman’s (2002) introduction of the concept of 
meaning response serves to replace the term “placebo effect.” 
Indeed, Brody (1980) had previously characterized Adler and 
Hammett’s (1973) meaning model as replacing the concept of 
placebo: “In this model, the subjective sense of meaning in 
the illness experience is factored into (1) system formation, or 
the providing of a coherent explanation of the illness consistent 
with the patient’s world view, and (2) group formation, or the 
gathering of a supportive, caring group around the patient” 
(Brody, 1980, p.  115). While Brody outlined the semantic and 
interpersonal components of meaning, Moerman mainly focused 
on the semantic component.
If, as potential benefit, informed consent fosters the patient’s 
meaning response this could facilitate an active engagement 
of patients in a recommended treatment which, from a 
motivational perspective, can be  understood in the context of 
the transtheoretical stages of change model as a step from the 
stages of precontemplation, contemplation or preparation to 
the stage of action (see e.g., Prochaska and Norcross, 2018).
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Despite the plausibility of the effects of meaning making 
cited above, neither Moerman (2002) nor Moerman and Jonas 
(2002) clarified their use of the term meaning or the concept 
of meaning response. According to Baumeister (1991), meaning 
can be  broadly defined as a “mental representation of possible 
relationships among things, events, and relationships. Thus, 
meaning connects things” (Baumeister, 1991, p.  15). On that 
basis, it is suggested here that if one takes meaning as the 
network of mental representations associated with a process 
of meaning making does not necessarily happen at a conscious 
level; as Park observed, “Meaning making has been conceptualized 
as both automatic and unconscious processes” (Park, 2010, 
p. 259), so that meaning need not necessarily be conceptualized 
solely within the realm of consciously held beliefs.
Returning to the conscious aspect of meaning in the context 
of psychotherapy, a rational explanation can potentially bestow 
meaning on a certain treatment by enriching the patient’s 
semantic network regarding the concept of psychotherapy and 
related concepts and association; the more compelling the 
explanation of treatment effects for the individual, the more 
intense the meaning response is likely to be  (Moerman and 
Jonas, 2002). For example, it is known that, among medical 
interventions, patients find surgery especially meaningful. This 
may be  because surgeons enjoy one of the highest credibility 
ratings among physicians, and because surgical procedures can 
mostly be  explained in accessible rational terms—for instance, 
“We will reconnect your upper arm bone with two screws, 
and then you  just have to wear a cast for three weeks” (for 
example, see Kaptchuk et  al., 2000). In contrast, explanations 
of pharmaceutical effects commonly engender weaker meaning 
responses because they are more complex and less palpable—for 
example, “The drug will inhibit the inflammation process by 
reducing the production of inflammatory substances in your 
body” (Moerman and Jonas, 2002).
We contend that in psychotherapy, the mechanisms of change 
are often even more abstract and less immediately accessible 
than many pharmacological terms or other medical concepts. 
Fortunately, these mechanisms are to a large extent common 
to many psychotherapeutic interventions, making it all the 
more important to embed accessible explanations of common 
factors within a convincing treatment rationale in order to 
engender the best possible meaning response.
The next section explicates how a patient’s meaning response 
can be supported by providing a convincing treatment rationale 
during the process of informed consent to psychotherapeutic 
treatment, and how this can help to realize common factors 
associated with a favorable psychotherapeutic outcome.
REALIZATION OF COMMON FACTORS 
IN PSYCHOTHERAPY THROUGH 
MEANING RESPONSE
Common factors can be defined as “those elements of psychotherapy 
that are so frequently present in different psychotherapeutic 
treatments that they cannot be considered to be restricted to one 
school of psychotherapy” (McAleavey and Castonguay, 2015, p. 295). 
In an empirical study based on expert ratings, Tracey (2003) 
identified three distinct clusters of common factors: bond, 
information, and structure, respectively referring to the therapeutic 
relationship, the provision of specific information and conceptual 
knowledge, and the explicit or implicit organization of psychotherapy 
as an interpersonal encounter. For example, if a therapist provides 
detailed information and a rational explanation of the proposed 
therapy as part of the informed consent procedure, this may 
enhance the patient’s perception of the therapist as a competent 
and trustworthy specialist, fostering positive expectations of process 
and outcome (see for example, Frank, 1968; Bloch, 2006) that 
relate mostly to positive treatment outcomes (Lambert, 2013). It 
follows that a patient’s meaning response to the provision of 
information at the beginning of psychotherapy is central to the 
realization of common factors. The patient’s meaning response 
can therefore be seen as an important precondition for a favorable 
psychotherapeutic process and outcome.
To optimize the meaning response, it is important that the 
informed consent process, including provision of a treatment 
rationale, is customized for the individual patient. According 
to Adler and Hammett (1973), provision of a treatment rationale 
is “system formation, or the providing of a coherent explanation 
of the illness consistent with the patient’s world view” 
(Brody, 1980, p.  115).
Because the mechanisms of change in psychotherapy are 
considered more complex than in other fields of medicine and 
the treatment process more individual, provision of a rationale 
for psychotherapeutic treatment must usually be more customized 
than, for example, in the case of pharmacological or surgical 
treatment (Trachsel et  al., 2015a,b). However, in so doing, 
psychotherapists have a moral duty to remain within the range 
of evidence-based treatments (e.g., Blease et  al., 2016a,b). 
Trachsel et  al. (2015a,b) put it as follows:
For example, in a symptom-focused psychotherapy, 
goals, risks, and procedures are more concretely 
nameable beforehand, whereas the goals of an insight-
oriented psychotherapy need to be  more openly 
formulated. Consequently, due to the less foreseeable 
course of an insight-oriented therapy, a more complex 
and contingent [informed consent] may be required at 
intake, whereas a more straightforward [informed 
consent] may be  pursued for symptom-focused 
psychotherapy that more closely resembles [informed 
consents] for pharmacological treatment. (776).
MS. HOPE’S MEANING RESPONSE
The following fictional case example serves to illustrate how the 
meaning response may contribute to the realization of common 
psychotherapy factors. On a friend’s recommendation, Ms. Hope 
entered psychotherapy because of sleeping problems and feelings 
of depression. She had no prior personal experience of 
psychotherapy and knew little or nothing about it or what effects 
to expect. At the beginning of the first session, she said “For 
me, it is just worth a shot. If I  don’t benefit, it will certainly 
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not cause any harm.” However, the therapist knew that a favorable 
course of psychotherapy depended crucially on positive outcome 
expectations and conveyed to the patient her conviction that 
evidence-based psychotherapy was the appropriate treatment. The 
therapist sought to ensure that initiating psychotherapy would 
make sense to Ms. Hope in order to motivate her to open up 
and to work hard on her problems. To foster these positive 
expectations, the therapist explained in clear and simple language 
how psychotherapy is thought to work in general—for example, 
that it is crucial to establish a confidential and trusting psychotherapy 
relationship to facilitate discussion of difficult topics. In addition, 
she explained how the specific evidence-based psychotherapy 
approach she practiced could help Ms. Hope (based on assumed 
and empirically supported efficacy factors). Additionally, the 
therapist provided Ms. Hope with a summary of the results of 
relevant psychotherapy research, showing that evidence-based 
psychotherapy is likely to be  successful for most patients with 
problems similar to her own. These explanations formed part 
of the informed consent procedure that the psychotherapist is 
legally and ethically obliged to provide. As the explanations begin 
to make sense to Ms. Hope, beginning psychotherapy becomes 
meaningful for her—in other words, Ms. Hope exhibits a meaning 
response. Developing trust in the psychotherapist and her approach, 
the patient gains confidence that the psychotherapy will help 
her to deal with her sleeping problems and feelings of depression.
CONCLUSION
We contend that Moerman’s notion of meaning response as 
the physiological or psychological effects of meaning in the 
course and treatment of illness should be  taken into account 
by healthcare professionals, including psychotherapists. To 
engender a strong meaning response in patients, psychotherapists 
should provide detailed and customized information in support 
of an accessible rational explanation of the proposed 
psychotherapy as part of the informed consent procedure. One 
factor that may also become a necessary part of the treatment 
rationale is the explication of treatment expectations (Constantino 
et al., 2011). For example, if a patient has the “passive” treatment 
expectation that the therapist will fix his or her problems 
without a contribution on his or her part, an active engagement 
in possibly effortful treatment procedures is less likely. To foster 
positive outcome expectancies, it might be  necessary to first 
teach the patient that his or her active engagement in potentially 
effortful therapy procedures will be  necessary to reach the 
best possible outcome. In addition, establishing an according 
task agreement will be  an important part of establishing a 
good therapeutic alliance as a booster of good outcome 
(Flückiger et  al., 2018; Westermann et  al., in press).
By strengthening both, the patient’s perception of the 
psychotherapist as a competent and trustworthy specialist, and 
the patient’s anticipation that his or her active personal 
engagement in psychotherapy will be  crucial for reaching the 
best possible outcome, it is also likely to foster the positive 
process and outcome expectations shown to be associated with 
positive treatment outcomes (Constantino et  al., 2011).
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